Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle
By B. Douglas Bernheim, S. Severinov. Journal of Political Economy, 2003
171 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Demography
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dccf91ec6757e093c5daf13dad29acc931843cf5
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Citations in the corpus
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009, methodology): “For these reasons, the structure of LSHP equilibria is reminiscent of the “D1” equilibria of Cho and Sobel (1990), the “central pooling” equilibria of Bernheim and Severinov (2003), and, in a more distant setting, the “variable bribes equilibria” of Esö and Schummer (2004).15 Indeed, Cho and Sobel…”
- Inter-vivos Transfers and Exchange (2006, background): “Bernheim and Severinov (2003) argue that parents prefer to be seen as loving their children equally.”
- Why Parents Play Favorites: Explanations for Unequal Bequests (2004, background): “405 Hilgard Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477 and NBER mcgarry@ucla.edu”
- Intergenerational Transfers and Inheritance: A Comparative View (2004, background): “13 Economic attempts to explain equal division by invoking a psychic cost of treating children unequally or a problem of signalling unequal affection (e.g., Bernheim & Severinov, 2000) are begging the question: Why should unequal treatment of children or unequal affection for them be a cost?”
- Microeconomic models of family transfers (2006, background): “Finally if the division of bequests is interpreted by the children as a sign of parental affection, the parent will be induced to divide equally (Bernheim and Severinov, 2003). Stark and Zhang (2002) imagine a situation with two children receiving transfers from an altruistic parent.”
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk (2007, unknown): “However, the arguments in [15] suggest that a refinement such as monotone D1 equilibrium [2] will isolate separating equilibria in our model.”
- Descent Rules and Strategic Transfers. Evidence from Matrilineal Groups in Ghana (2007, unknown): “Specifically, I will estimate the following model: Pr(Tic = 1) = Φ(Xiβ + Zcξ + γ ·Akani + δ ·Akani ∗Nephewi + λ ·Nephewi) (6) where Φ is the Normal cdf, Tic is a binary variable taking value one if parent i receives transfers from child c; Xi is a set of parental (recipient’s) characteristics, Zc is”