Bundling as an Entry Barrier

By B. Nalebuff. 2004

535 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel (2007, unknown): “This may or may not be predatory or exclusionary: it depends on how much the monopolist “squeezes” complementors because a price squeeze induces complementors to offer as much surplus as possible in the complementary market (Whinston, 1990; Nalebuff, 2004).”
Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling (2009, methodology): “21 Therefore, 20A similar framework is used in Nalebuff (2004, section III.C). See Reisinger (2006) for further analysis of the effect of correlation in a related framework.”
Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control (2018, unknown): “Whereas other studies analyze bundling for its ability to capture rents (Salinger 1995, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1998, McAfee et al. 1989) or provide competitive advantage (Nalebuff 2004, Eisenmann et al. 2011), our approach focuses on R&D spillovers.”
Abuse of Market Power (2005, unknown): “A recent contribution to that economic analysis is Nalebuff (2004).”
Opening Platforms: How, When and Why? (2008, methodology): “Furthermore, using this strategy, a dominant firm may be able to undermine existing rivals or deter entrants in its core market if they are dependent on standalone suppliers for a crucial complement (Nalebuff, 2004).”