Properties of Scoring Auctions

By John Asker, Estelle Cantillon. 2008

376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dc5ecc65c78b3c2454c3f138d69535003c65e846

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. S. Houghton
2. S. Tadelis
3. Patrick Bajari
4. Caroline Flammer
5. O. Williamson
6. Francesco Decarolis
7. Peter G. Klein
8. Jonathan D. Levin

In Marketing

1. S. Tadelis
2. S. Houghton
3. Patrick Bajari
4. John Geweke
5. Hiroshi Ohashi

In Safety Research

1. S. Houghton
2. S. Tadelis
3. Patrick Bajari
4. Caroline Flammer

Citations in the corpus

• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis (2006, methodology): “9 We denote the expected income 8 See Osband and Reichelstein (1985), Che (1993), and Bushnell and Oren (1994) for early work on scoring auctions, and a recent generalization by Asker and Cantillon (2004).”
• Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence (2011, neutral): “In our analysis of the A+B auctions, we follow the existing literature on scoring auctions starting with Che (1993), allowing for multidimensional type as in Asker and Cantillon (2008b)).”
• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014, neutral): “A r )A + (� X d + � X r )X (� D d + � D r )D ( 1 )”