Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy

By Yaniv Grinstein, Roni Michaely. 2005

768 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/da0571cecd757d06aa86da4408def19202af9eea

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Citations in the corpus

The effect of financial reporting quality on corporate dividend policy (2017, neutral): “, Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Chang and Zhang 2015) and employ the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) methodology developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). Specifically, we estimate the following two-equation PVAR model(15): Dividendjt 1⁄4 β0 þ β1RQjt−1 þ β2RQjt−2 þ β3Dividendjt−1 þ β4Dividendjt−2 þ ”
How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection? (2015, positive): “Accordingly, they prefer firms to pay dividends but without actually demanding higher payouts (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005 and 2006).”
Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world (2007, background): “For example, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argue that dividend payout may affect firm ownership.”
Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons (2013, background): “This might explain why prior tests involving the level of institutional ownership might not find a significant impact of ownership on payout policy (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).”
Dividend changes and catering incentives (2006, background): “Consistent with our assumption, Grinstein and Michaely (2003) report that institutional holdings are related to both a dividend indicator variable and the dividend level.”
Disappearing Dividends, Catering, and Risk (2009, positive): “From an empirical viewpoint, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) conduct a comprehensive study on institutional ownership and dividend policy between 1980 and 1996.”
Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, positive): “…of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies sense, the influence of agent owners on firm performance appears to exist in the presence of moderator variables (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Ramaswamy, 2001; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “…proposals (Gillan and Starks (2000)), while another strand studies the effects of institutional investors on corporate policies, including leverage (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2014)), dividends (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)) and R&D (Bushee (1998), Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)).”
Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, positive): “Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that higher firm payouts attract institutional holdings, while Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), and Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2015) find that active investors target firms with weak governance and high leverage”
Payout Policy in the 21st Century (2003, positive): “12This result is consistent with the empirical results of Grinstein and Michaely (2005), who find no relation between the level of dividends and the extent of the institutional holdings (other than institutions preferring firms with nonzero dividends).”
Industry contagion in loan spreads (2012, neutral): “17 investors are better informed and more capable monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).”
Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions (2010, background): “With their large holdings maintained over time, dedicated owners offer executives the tacit assurance that they will not be disciplined (e.g., via sell-off) for investing in long-term strategic actions (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005).”
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (2011, neutral): “14 Similar measure has been used in other recent studies such as Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) and Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). investors are better informed and more capable monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).”