Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994
By Armen Hovakimian, Edward J. Kane. 2000
244 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d96da134fde2d98f962c1487fa031c4d7b954a75
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In Economics and Econometrics
- D. Anginer
- F. González
- V. Acharya
- Georgios Chortareas
- Alexia Ventouri
- A. Warburton
- David Miles
- Luc Laeven
In Finance
- F. González
- D. Anginer
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- Georgios Chortareas
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Citations in the corpus
- Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, unknown): “…when there is uncertainty about 3 Although relaxing restrictions may also increase opportunities for bank diversification, Flannery (1998) and Hovakimian and Kane (2000) note that restrictions on bank activities have been viewed by…”
- The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (2013, background): “…government guarantees, as the guarantee provides protection against losses (Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel 2010; Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler 2010; De Nicoló 2000; Hovakimian and Kane 2000; Boyd and Runkle 1993; Boyd and Gertler 1994; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002, 2006).”
- Monetary Policy and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Corporate Loan Market (2017, unknown): “…for risk to their ownership structures (Saunders et al. (1990)), competition in the banking sector (Keeley (1990)), the presence of deposit insurance (Hovakimian and Kane (2000)), government bailout policies (Gropp et al. (2011)), and the compensation of bank managers (DeYoung et al. (2012)).”
- Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance (2002, background): “More generally, Kane (2000) argues that the design of financial safety nets should take country factors into account, particularly the informational environment and the enforceability of private contracts.”
- Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk (2005, background): “This latter result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Kane (2000), Cull et al.”
- The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure (2010, unknown): “systematic comparison of the bankruptcy costs for firms and banks, Mason’s (2005) results do suggest that bankruptcy costs for banks are not systematically lower than for firms.”
- A Survival Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Banks (2016, unknown): “The result is in line with the literature that finds systemically important banks are insensitive to capital discipline measures; instead they try to maximize the added value from the financial safety net they enjoy (Hovakimian and Kane 2000).”
- The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy (2008, background): “Kahane (1977); Koehn & Santomero (1980); Kim & Santomero (1988) and Hovakimian & Kane (2000), however, argue that capital regulation has failed to control risk-shifting incentives.”
- What Caused the Bank Capital Build-Up of the 1990s? (2008, unknown): “First, banks may have monopoly protection (Keeley [1990]).”
- The Impacts of Free Cash Flows and Agency Costs on Firm Performance (2010, background): “Operating Performance Return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are the most commonly adopted measures for corporate operating performance [29-32].”
- Bank supervision, regulation, and efficiency: evidence from the European Union (2012, background): “Prior to the recent crisis, a number of studies have emphasised the role of capital standards in protecting banks from failure and in protecting their customers, as well as the whole economy, from negative externalities (e.g. Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Gorton and Winton,1995; Rochet, 1992).”
- Pricing of deposit insurance (2010, unknown): “Hovakimian and Kane (2000) find that US banks shifted risk onto the safety net during the period 1985 to 1994, despite regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting.”