What Caused the Bank Capital Build-Up of the 1990s?

By Mark J. Flannery, Kasturi P. Rangan. 2008

442 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a17162545845f52811e150fce2bd165e19dc75d2

Citations in the corpus

• Leverage across firms, banks, and countries ☆ (2012, unknown): “Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) find large variation in banks’ capital ratios and investigate whether capital requirements are a first-order determinant of banks’ capital structure.”
• Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions (2011, unknown): “Evidence by Flannery and Rangan (2008), Berger and others (2008), and Gropp and Heider (2010) suggests, however, that bank capital structures are determined by the same factors as those for non-financial firms and that specific factors for banks are only of secondary importance.”
• Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks (2013, unknown): “Thus, as hypothesized by Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010), more profitable banks or banks that distribute lower dividends tend to hold higher capital buffers, because they benefit from a better ability to accumulate capital from funds generated internally.”
• Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking (2014, unknown): “…impacts negatively on welfare, as it reduces both the 17These findings reflect the well-known result that constraints may not be binding on equilibrium paths (see, e.g., Ayagari (1995)), and are consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Flannery and Kasturi (2008) and Flannery (2005).”
• The Dynamics of Bank Spreads and Financial Structure (2014, unknown): “Specifically, while capital requirements constitute the minimum level, banks often endogenously choose to hold more capital against unexpected credit losses or market discipline may induce them to hold more capital (Flannery and Rangan, 2004).”
• Bank capital management: International evidence (2015, unknown): “An increasing body of empirical research provides support for the existence of an optimal capital structure (e.g., Marcus (1983), Flannery and Rangan (2008); Schaeck and Cihak (2011)).”
• Bank Behavior in Response to Basel III: A Cross-Country Analysis (2011, unknown): “This convex property predicted by the call option view of bank capital distinguishes this model from the partial adjustment model of bank capital estimated by Flannery and Rangan (2008), Berrospide and Edge (2010), Francis and Osborne (2009).”
• The Procyclical Effects of Basel II (2008, unknown): “See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (2004), Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2005), and Gordy and Howells (2006). 2The corporate finance literature provides a wealth of reasons (from debt tax shields to agency and asymmetric information costs) whereby equity may be more costly than other fin”
• Bank Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Trade-Off or a Faustian Bargain? (2014, unknown): “…banking from a social efficiency standpoint, especially when one considers that the documented capital buffers were not related to asset volatility (Flannery & Rangan 2008), and that US investment banks, which were at the epicenter of the subprime crisis, had much lower capital levels than did…”
• Taxes and Bank Capital Structure (2016, unknown): “…work on bank capital structure primarily focuses on the bank-specific determinants of (optimal) bank capital structure (Gropp and Heider (2010), Flannery and Rangan (2008), Berger et al. (2008)) or on how banks make capital structure adjustments (De Jonghe and Öztekin (2013), Memmel and…”
• The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from an International Sample of Large Banks* (2013, unknown): “It is a widely- documented empirical fact that banks hold capital above minimum regulatory requirements (e.g., Brewer, Kaufman and Wall, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010).”
• Deposits and Bank Capital Structure (2015, unknown): “Some recent examples are Flannery and Rangan (2008), Gropp and Heider (2010) and Mehran and Thakor (2011).”