On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules
By I. Pérez, A. Martín. 2001
243 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9460e07560a112cf063d88ef437e87fc2962a7f
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- Lars A. Stole
- Drew Fudenberg
- Mark Armstrong
- Josef Hofbauer
- Edward J. Cartwright
- Larry Samuelson
- David K. Levine
- William H. Sandholm
Citations in the corpus
- The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition (2009, unknown): “…to visit either bank, such that banks perfectly price discriminate based upon borrower’s location and the difference in transportation costs to visit either bank branch (as in Thisse and Vives (1988 To conclude, differential transportation costs determine branch geographical reach and loan pricing.”
- Competition and regulation in the banking sector: A review of the empirical evidence on the sources of bank rents (2007, background): “…V.C. Distance may determine the pricing of loans because either the transportation costs incurred by the borrower (Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse and Vives (1988)), the monitoring costs incurred by the lender (Sussman and Zeira (1995)), or the quality of information obtained by the…”
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition (2007, background): “ Thisse and Vives (1988) consider this effect in the Hotelling line with two firms”
- Agglomeration and economic geography (2003, unknown): “15There are many good reasons to believe that firms want to use spatial separation to segment their market (Thisse and Vives, 1988), wheras empirical work confirms the assumption that international, or even interregional, markets are still very segmented (Greenhut, 1981; Head and Mayer, 2000).”
- Quality of Information and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination (2004, unknown): “The uniform distribution renders the equilibrium solvable in closed-form expressions , which enables us to characterize the solution to the entire game in a very transparent way (see, for example, Thisse and Vives, 1988, section 3, for a similar approach).”
- Regional Specialization, Urban Hierarchy, and Commuting Costs (2006, unknown): “This assumption is supported by empirical investigations (Head and Mayer, 2000) and can be given some theoretical justification (Thisse and Vives, 1988).”
- Online advertising and privacy (2014, unknown): “This result therefore delineate a new rational for the non profitability of price discrimination in competitive environments (See Thisse and Vives (1988), Chen and Zhang (2001), and Chen and Iyer (2002) not to be exhaustive).”
- Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition (2003, background): “We will see a clear example of this in the Hotellingdemand model of Thisse and Vives (1988) which examines discriminatory pricing based on observable location.”
- Nonlinear Pricing with Product Customization in Mobile Service Industry (2011, unknown): “Since the seminal paper of Thisse and Vives (1988), the Hotelling’s spatial competition model has been used extensively to study product customization.”
- Price Discrimination and Competition (2007, background): “McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) provide a general set of results in this context.”
- Distance, Lending Relationships and Competition (2005, unknown): “Economists have long analyzed price discrimination and inferred its importance (Phlips (1983), Thisse and Vives (1988), Stole (2001)).”