The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure
By M. Lasfer. 2006
183 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d8c4339effd2733ef7375ec4f03000e7e1ece706
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- H. Grove
- L. Patelli
- Pisun Xu
- Lisa M. Victoravich
- Paul M. Guest
- Tasawar Nawaz
- Collins G. Ntim
- Mercedes Rodríguez-Fernández
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Citations in the corpus
- The Determinants of Board Size and Composition: Evidence from the UK (2008, result): “Our findings are consistent with previous findings (Young, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2003; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Lasfer, 2006; Dahya and McConnell, 2007)”
- Corporate governance and cash holdings in MENA: Evidence from internal and external governance practices (2017, unknown): “Proper corporate governance mechanisms are thus crucial in resolving this conflict by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers (Lasfer, 2006).”
- Governance, Efficiency and Risk Taking in Chinese Banking (2017, unknown): “According to this view (e.g. Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Lasfer, 2006), duality enables CEOs to leverage their power for their own personal outcomes, an effect that has recently been associated by some authors (Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2011) with the ‘entrenchment theory’.”
- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “The main disadvantages of CEO duality identified in the literature come from (a) the negative impact on board’s monitoring activity (Jensen 1993; Lasfer 2006), and (b) increased managerial power to influence board decisions.26 For instance, CEOs who also retain the position of chairm n will tend to…”
- Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, background): “In the agency framework, Lasfer (2006) finds that as managerial ownership increases, managers use their ownership power to select a board that is unlikely to monitor.”