The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation

By John E. Core, W. Guay, David F. Larcker. 2008

793 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d85b0750ab4025a21ccf3f280852fd7a65b2e52a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. David F. Larcker
2. Christopher S. Armstrong
3. Qiang Cheng
4. W. Guay
5. Terry Shevlin
6. John E. Core
7. Sadok El Ghoul
8. Omrane Guedhami

In Finance

1. Qiang Cheng
2. David F. Larcker
3. W. Guay
4. Christopher S. Armstrong
5. Halbert White
6. Terry Shevlin
7. John E. Core
8. Sadok El Ghoul

Citations in the corpus

• The Role of the Business Press as an Information Intermediary (2010, background): “Because conference call transcripts often repeat the entire text of the earnings announcement press release, using the daily maximum word count reduces the chance that we double-count firm disclosure.”
• Textual Analysis of Corporate Disclosures: A Survey of the Literature (2011, neutral): “…disclosures, such as financial analysts’ reports [De Franco, Vasari, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2010; Huang, Zang, and Zheng, 2010], media [Miller, 2006; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008; Soltes, 2009; Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm, 2010], and internet message boards [Antweiler and Frank, 2004].”
• New Evidence on the Role of the Media in Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, positive): “Similarly, Core et al. (2008) identify that highly paid CEOs at large firms attract negative media attention.”
• Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, methodology): “To do so, we follow the compensation model used by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) and regress the logged total compensation of the 30   subordinate executives on economic determinants, including prior year’s logged firm sales, S&P 500 membership dummy, prior year’s book-to-market ratio, current and…”
• Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, neutral): “In theory, the resulting pressure from the media could potentially put an upper-bound on executive compensation, but empirical work has shown that negative media coverage of executive compensation tends to change the form of subsequent pay rather than absolute levels (Bednar, 2012; Core et al., 2008”
• Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (2009, methodology): “The excess compensation metric is derived following the approach employed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008).”
• Family Firms, Employee Satisfaction, and Corporate Performance (2015, background): “Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2482003 17 Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) argue that Excess ln(CEO pay) reflects weak corporate governance, while Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that busy boards are less effective monitors.”
• The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, neutral): “…prior work suggests the primary determinant of CEO pay is the pay of the firm’s size and industry peers (e.g., Albuquerque, 2009; Albuquerque, De Franco, and Verdi, 2009) and that the popular press uses size and industry benchmarks when judging excess pay (e.g., Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008).”