Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences

By Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Isil Erel, René M. Stulz, Rohan Williamson. 2009

644 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7d4bd46f3e1fe986f75e20926ae12bbbb419d77

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) (2012, positive): “For example, Aggarwal et al. (2009) employ the ISS governance data to compare governance quality between U.S. and international firms.”
Bribes and Firm Value (2017, methodology): “Second, following Aggarwal et al. (2009), I measure firm governance using forty-four governance attributes provided by RiskMetrics/ISS(23).”
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, positive): “Fourth, our findings complement the prior literature focusing on the role of institutional investors and specifically foreign institutional investors for shareholder value (e.g., Gillan and Starks 2003; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 2009; Aggarwal et al. 2009; especially Aggarwal ”
Corporate social responsibility, country-level predispositions, and the consequences of choosing a level of disclosure (2016, methodology): “Therefore, we include country dummies to account for country sources of heterogeneity and we follow Aggarwal et al. (2009) in their multi-country approach by clustering residuals at the country level.”
How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions (2019, background): “…find a positive relation between board independence and corporate outcomes (e.g., Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Cotter et al., 1997; Dahya et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2009), others find no relation (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Bhagat and Black, 2002) or changing relations depending on a firm’s…”
Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, neutral): “…optimal internal governance mechanisms at their disposal because of the U.S.’s high financial and economic development and strong investor protection (Aggarwal et al. (2009)). as M&A laws significantly increase cross-border M&A activity (see, e.g., Bris and Cabolis (2008a), Ferreira et al. (2010)).”
Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, positive): “Aggarwal et al. (2009) note firm value losses associated with the lack of auditor ratification at an annual shareholder meeting.”
Cross-Listing, Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, and the Learning Hypothesis (2012, methodology): “GOV Governance index based on forty-one attributes on board, audit, antitakeover, compensation, and ownership developed by Aggarwal et al. (2011) RiskMetrics (Sample restricted to the 2003–2006 period)”
Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, neutral): “As suggested by Aggarwal et al. (2008), governance standards may be selected by the controlling shareholder to maximize his private value of the firm.”
Corporate governance practices in emerging markets: The case of GCC countries (2014, background): “Weights are 1 See, Brown and Caylor (2006), Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Heidrick and Struggles (2009) for other indices constructed on developed markets.”
What Matters and for Which Firms for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets? Evidence from Brazil (and Other BRIK Countries) (2012, background): “The RiskMetrics (formerly ISS) index covers only developed countries (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009).1 Summing up, to identify what matters in corporate governance, in which countries, one needs a broad index that is (i) tailored to the nuances of particular countries; yet (ii) has sufficient…”
The liability of foreignness in capital markets: Sources and remedies (2011, positive): “Their results are consistent with the findings of Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009).”