Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games

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Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group (2005, background): “2002a), punishment (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and G chter 2000; Gintis 2000), even altruistic punishment (Fehr and G chter 2002) and volunteering (Hauert et al. 2002; Semmann et al. 2003) as mechanisms that can promote”
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans (2011, background): “It has been shown both experimentally (58–60) and theoretically (61, 62) that allowing opting out promotes cooperation.”
Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review (2014, background): “For example, cyclic dominance has been observed in public goods games with volunteering [66,67], peer punishment [35,66,68,69], pool punishment [70,71] and reward [72–74], but also in pairwise social dilemmas with coevolution [75,76] or with jokers [77].”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “Models exploring cooperation in optional public goods games (Hauert et al., 2002) motivated experiments demonstrating the cyclic dominance predicted theoretically (Semmann et al., 2003).”