The natural philosophy of agency
By Shaun Gallagher. 2007
164 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d69d91134e2434ee6d84c2b315b1ebc6a9c1201b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Shaun Gallagher
- E. D. Di Paolo
- T. Buhrmann
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Hanne De Jaegher
- Thomas Fuchs
- Tom Froese
- Xabier E. Barandiaran
Citations in the corpus
- Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. (2008, unknown): “To test the contribution of the CM to explaining the SoA, it has first to be clarified what is meant by ''sense of agency''.”
- Multiple aspects in the sense of agency (2012, background): “Both of these aspects, the intentional aspect (what gets accomplished, or fails to get accomplished, by the action) and the motor (or efferent) aspect (the sense that I am causing or controlling my bodily movement) enter into SA1 (Gallagher 2007a, in press).”
- Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency (2012, unknown): “, 2008; Ehrsson, 2012), and the sense of authorship over bodily movements, termed the sense of “agency” (Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Haggard, 2005; Gallagher, 2007; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008a).”
- The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, methodology): “At a general level we can distinguish between a pre-reflective and a reflective selfawareness in action (Gallagher 2007, 2012).”
- How does it feel to act together? (2014, background): “There is now a growing consensus that the motor prediction view and the cognitive reconstruction view are not mutually exclusive but complementary and that intrinsic cues (cues provided by the motor system) and extrinsic cues (such as cognitive primes) both contribute to the sense of agency (Bayne &”
- The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “However, as several authors have pointed out (Gallagher, 2007; Knoblich & Repp, 2009; Pacherie, 2008), the results of some of these studies are open to alternative interpretations in terms of perceptual rather than sensorimotor cues.”