Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts

By Steven N. Kaplan, Per Strömberg. 2003

1,917 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d61ce048b7b9b17134ef764e2fe273eac39ae1c5

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Citations in the corpus

A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings (2004, positive): “8 Venture capitalists (VCs) often design contracts that separate votes from capital to provide stronger inc tives but without explicitly using dual-class shares(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002).”
Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard (2010, background): “Conceptually, our analysis suggests that explanations based on size should not be divorced from explanations based on incentives, and that investment and managerial compensation are complementary incentive instruments, in line with the empirical findings of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).”
Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “Accordingly, contracts here called “relational” are sometimes called “self-enforcing” ( Klein and Leffler, 1981; Telser, 1981 ), “implicit” ( MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989 ), or both (Bull, 1987). A common approach to modeling such relational contracts is to use a repeated game, just as models of taci”
IPOs, trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis (2007, positive): “This stems from the fact that a duration is defined herein as the time elapsed between the actual round date when the firm received the funding from the venture capitalist and the time of the analysis (June 23rd, 2003); 14As indicated in Lee and Wang (2003): “This is perhaps the most important conce”
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital‐Backed Start‐Ups (2015, neutral): “See, for instance, Gompers (1995); Kaplan and Strömberg (2003); De Bettignies (2008); and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2010).”
Preplanned Exit Strategies in Venture Capital (2008, neutral): “10 between Europe and the US, in terms of private investor contractual governance, is in the use of convertible securities in the US (Sahlman, 1990; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1998; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).”
Network-based Research in Entrepreneurship: A Decade in Review (2015, background): “…uncertain, the claims that partners make through the negotiation of specific contractual terms should the venture succeed, and through monitoring and liquidation rights when it does not, can have implications for the share of the wealth that flows to the entrepreneur (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).”
Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks Versus Venture Capital (2008, positive): “By contrast, as shown by Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2001), venture capitalists often hold seats on the borrowing firm’s board and voting rights far in excess of their cash flow rights, and they could have the contractual right to replace the entrepreneur with a new manager if…”
The throne vs. the kingdom: Founder control and value creation in startups (2017, background): “In essence, the interests of the entrepreneur and of the investor can diverge because the investor cares about financial returns while the entrepreneur also enjoys private benefits of control (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Grossman and Hart, 1988; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003).”