The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis

By A. Greif. 2000

258 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d58f27a831a6fc5d7cf0e0713f258cc4ca253dca

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Citations in the corpus

Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (2006, unknown): “For earlier and partial expositions of this interpretation, see Greif (1989, 1992, 1994a, 1997a, 1996b, 1998a, 1998b, 2000).”
Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution (2012, unknown): “15See Greif (1993, 2000, 2006), Greif et al. (1994), and van Zanden (2009) for discussions of the institutions developed to solve problems of insecure property rights and uncertain contract enforcement in the Middle Ages.”
What drove 19th century commodity market integration (2006, background): “As to the former, a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work attests to the role of networks in overcoming incomplete information and fostering commercial linkages between nations (Casella and Rauch, 2003; Greif, 1993, 2000; Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Trindale, 2002).”
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? (2011, background): “However, in all but the simplest market exchanges, enforcement problems arise due to the “fundamental problem of exchange” ( Greif 2000 ).”
Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model (2008, background): “…from established rules and norms that are calculated by rational economic actors to be personally beneficial, as in a game-theoretic framework, where actors choose either to cooperate with institutions or to cheat, defect, renege, shirk or transgress (Greif, 1994, 2000, 2006; Weingast, 1995).”
Comparative Financial Systems: A Survey (2001, background): “• Historically, financial activity has often taken place without an effective legal system or with a legal system that did not play an important role (see, e.g. Greif (2000)).”