Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
By A. Greif. 2006
1,279 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c00c97cbf6ef2f298e4641c86e53fe8f9f68b56e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- A. W. Carus
- Sheilagh Ogilvie
- Andreas P. Kyriacou
- Michael A. Witt
- Garry D. Bruton
- William R. Easterly
- D. Ahlstrom
- Masahiko Aoki
Citations in the corpus
- Governance Institutions and Economic Activity (2009, background): “The government’s legitimacy is important for its laws to translate into effective order (Avner Greif 2006, 147-150), but more may be needed.”
- Institutions: top down or bottom up? (2008, positive): “Avner Greif’s pioneering research (summarized in Greif 2006) suggested how networks of merchants can enforce contracts in the absence of any formal institutions.”
- Building Inclusive Markets in Rural Bangladesh: How Intermediaries Work Institutional Voids (2012, methodology): “Institutions, metaphorically referred to as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990), matter for markets; they enable and support market activity (Campbell & Lindberg, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Greif, 2006; Sen, 1999).”
- Culture and Institutions (2015, neutral): “For a review, see Guiso et al. (2006). For other more recent examples, see Aghion et al.”
- Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model (2008, background): “…from established rules and norms that are calculated by rational economic actors to be personally beneficial, as in a game-theoretic framework, where actors choose either to cooperate with institutions or to cheat, defect, renege, shirk or transgress (Greif, 1994, 2000, 2006; Weingast, 1995).”
- Culture, meaning, and institutions: Executive rationale in Germany and Japan (2009, positive): “, Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001; Fligstein, 2001; Guillén, 2001; Biggart and Delbridge, 2004; Sorge, 2005), and/or (b) different equilibria in the combining of institutions (e.g., Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Amable, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Greif, 2006).”
- How (Not) to measure institutions (2012, background): “More recently, Greif (2006) has proposed a very broad definition deliberately attempting”
- Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach (2011, neutral): “We know surprisingly little, however, about the institutional developments that led to these modern successes’ (Greif, 2005: 773).”
- Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, positive): “Aoki (2001) and Greif (2006) picture the institution as the self-reinforcing equilibrium of a social game.”
- The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2016, positive): “Cultural evolution may also be closely interrelated with institutional development (Greif, 2006; Greif and Tabellini, 2010).”
- International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization (2014, background): “See also Greif and Laitin (2004) and Greif (2006a) who study the role of changing income distribution for institutional change in a comparative study of Venice and Genoa.”
- Religion, Politics, and Development: Lessons from the Lands of Islam (2008, background): “…institutions that were adapted to the prevailing economic conditions at the time of their emergence have proven a barrier at a more advanced stage of economic development, by which time Western societies had undergone basic transformations (Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998; Kuran, 2004b; Greif, 2006).”