Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo-Saxons

By R. Dore. 2000

548 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Systems thinking, market failure, and the development of innovation policy: The case of Australia (2011, background): “Much research into NIS and national variety – such the “varieties of capitalism” literature (Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Berger and Dore, 1996), and those concerned with how social and political contexts influence the creation of and rationale for institutions (Boyer, 1996) – has emphasized…”
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants (2003, background): “Individuals and institutional investors generally follow investment strategies attempting to maximize the market value of their shares, as well as their dividend payouts (Dore, 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000).”
The Capitalization of Almost Everything (2007, background): “…economic life broadly defined, which is seen to have agency at a range of scales, from generating instability within the economic system as a whole (Dore, 2000), through the pressure exerted on corporations in capital markets (Froud et al, 2006; Pike, 2006; Sinclair, 2005), to the equity effects…”
The determinants of tax haven FDI (2016, background): “This means that MNEs from CMEs are more likely to take a long run product-market strategy (Deeg, 2009) and are thus less likely to want to take advantage of short-term taxavoidance schemes that might divert the attention of stakeholders away from the firm’s core competencies (Dore, 2000).”
Varieties of capitalism and the internationalization of state-owned enterprises (2019, background): “Thanks to durable ties between firms and banks, CMEs involve a lower level of market capitalization and more patient capital, thus incorporating long-termoriented models of finance (Dore, 2000).”
Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2009, unknown): “Although this novel cross-industry prediction has not been tested empirically yet, the result that stakeholder orientation can be beneficial for firm value is consistent with the findings in Fauver and Fuerst (2006) and Ginglinger et al.”
The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: How Agency Theory Brought Down the Economy and Why it Might Again (2010, unknown): “Japanese firms are increasingly appointing outside directors, reducing board size to make boards more accountable, and expanding investor relations services to boost investor confidence (Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Dore, 2000; Jacoby, 2005, 2006).”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Here, the short-termism of capital markets and shareholder value are argued to undermine long-term commitments to employees (R.P. Dore, 2000; Lane, 2003).”
From comparing capitalisms to the politics of institutional change (2008, background): “However, institutional change in recent years has disrupted many of the distributional compromises embedded within past models of capitalism, precipitating more intense distributive struggles among major social groups (Dore, 2000).”
The Rise and Fall of Capital: Corporate Malaysia in Historical Perspective (2009, background): “In Japan, companies developed with banks an interlocking ownership relationship that aided the implementation of long-term business strategies (Dore, 2000).”
Measuring Organizational Performance: Towards Methodological Best Practice (2009, background): “The “Anglo-American” model of the United States and the United Kingdom gives primacy to the interests of shareholders (Dore, 2000).”
Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers (2004, background): “To discipline managers, corporations place greater emphasis upon internal mechanisms such as boards of directors that exhibit broad stakeholder representation, including labor, creditors, and regulatory agencies (Charkham, 1994; Prowse, 1995; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1996; Dore, 2000).”
Money flows like mercury: the geography of global finance (2005, background): “…systems that either do not have these institutions (such as funded pensions) or have developed models of corporate governance that tend to distribute income and revenue for consumption and investment through the claims of stakeholders (as in Germany and Japan; see Dore (2000) and Roe (1994)).”
The political economy of comparative corporate governance (2003, background): “Increasingly, however, these interpretations are being challenged (see, for example, Dore, 2000; Lordon, 2000; Weller, 2001).”
Institutional Reproduction and Change (2010, background): “…globalization and increased international competition, national political economies have not demonstrated much convergence toward common modes of corporate governance, human resource management, or other institutionalized business practices as globalization has advanced (Dore 2000; Jacoby 2005).”