On the Morality of Artificial Agents

By Luciano Floridi, J. Sanders. Minds and Machines, 2004

907 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d481abe5b376ecdb768035f3136163d3f9255974

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Citations in the corpus

Against the moral Turing test: accountable design and the moral reasoning of autonomous systems (2016, background): “…the larger issues of what inferences autonomous systems must execute to embody moral principle in important contexts (2015); in many ways, this reroutes the issue of MTT back into how a moral agent is analyzed in terms of capabilities, not necessarily tested as such (Floridi and Sanders 2004).”
Transparency and the Black Box Problem: Why We Do Not Trust AI (2021, background): “Trust typically is thought to be relational where A trusts B to do X (Flores & Solomon, 1998).”
Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics (2020, background): “Machine ethics is ethics for machines, for ‘ethical machines’, for machines as subjects , rather than for the human use of machines as objects (Floridi and Saunders 2004; Moor 2006; Anderson and Anderson 2011; Wallach and Asaro 2017).”
The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate (2016, neutral): “Requirements for moral agency may diﬀer between humans and algorithms; Floridi and Sanders (2004b) and Sullins (2006) argue, for instance, that ‘machine agency’ requires signiﬁcant autonomy, interactive behaviour, and a role with causal accountability, to be distinguished from moral responsibility,…”
When the algorithm itself is a racist: Diagnosing ethical harm in the basic Components of Software (2016, background): “For the sake of philosophical argument, an algorithm is either specified hypothetically in general terms or it is ruled to be off-limits as inaccessible to the analysts (Floridi & Sanders, 2004).”
The Method of Levels of Abstraction (2008, methodology): “In Floridi and Sanders (2004a) and Floridi and Sanders (2004b) , the method of levels of abstraction has been proposed as a more inter-subjective, socially constructible (hence possibly conventional), dynamic and flexible way to further Kant’s approach.”
Ethics as Methods: Doing Ethics in the Era of Big Data Research—Introduction (2018, background): “…situational and that moral situations involve a relationship between, at least, an originator of an action—or a moral agent and the recipient of actions—or a moral patient, then the actions of the agent and the harms or benefits to the patient can and should be evaluated (Floridi & Sanders, 2004).”
The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence (2019, background): “For instance, Floridi and Sanders argue that ethical discourse has been “unduly constrained by its anthropocentric conception of agenthood” (2004, p. 350).”
Artificial Intelligence and Management: The Automation–Augmentation Paradox (2020, positive): “The use of AI for managerial tasks implies that machines are no longer simple artifacts, but a new class of agents in organizations (Floridi & Sanders, 2004).”