Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?

By J. Addison, C. Schnabel, Joachim Wagner. Social Science Research Network, 2007

141 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi-rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent-seeking by reducing investments. The U.S. evidence points clearly in this direction. The authors of this paper investigate whether the same is true for German works councils, the analogue of workplace unionism in that nation. Using establishment panel data for the years 1998–2003, they find no evidence that a works council's formation adversely affected investment or that its dissolution favorably affected investment.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d31eb62f14d97d3945732126cbace81d480dc898

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

  1. B. Palier
  2. Thomas Zwick
  3. A. Verdun

In Political Science and International Relations

  1. B. Palier
  2. Kathleen Thelen
  3. Thomas Zwick
  4. J. Addison
  5. Paulino Teixeira
  6. Marius R. Busemeyer
  7. A. Verdun
  8. Tim Bartley

In Public Administration

  1. Thomas Zwick
  2. Kathleen Thelen
  3. J. Addison
  4. Paulino Teixeira
  5. Thomas Prosser
  6. Lucio Baccaro
  7. Christian Goebel

Citations in the corpus