The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
By Mark A. Pollack. 2003
684 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d2dac484d4f1596c4773e2c2a8ffe93d035b3e08
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In Political Science and International Relations
- Andreas Dür
- Berthold Rittberger
- Burkard Eberlein †
- Scott Greer
- Dirk De Bièvre
- R. Dehousse
- F. Scharpf
- Edgar Grande ‡
Citations in the corpus
- Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union (2008, background): “Scholars working in a rationalist principal–agent perspective insist on the nature of comitology as a mechanism for member state principals to control the supranational agent Commission in the execution of common policies (Pollack 2003).”
- Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state (2005, background): “Studies in accord with this perspective have found that transaction costs, in general, and the need for credible commitment, in particular, account for the willingness of member states to delegate political authority to the supranational level (Majone 1999; Pollack 2003).”
- Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American Trade Policy (2005, background): “We can distinguish ex ante and ex post controls (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Pollack, 2003).”
- The Asymmetry of European Integration - or why the EU cannot be a Social Market Economy (2010, background): “could expect, and does, indeed, find, European legislation establishing quite demanding European standards above the level of the lowest common denominator, and, perhaps, also above the level achieved in the median member state (Eichener, 1997; Pollak, 2003; Vogel, 2003; Knill, 2008).”
- Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “Regulators independent from direct political intervention are commonly considered to possess the political independence and professional expertise to design regulatory rules that fulfil precisely theses functions (see Majone 1997, 2000; Pollack 2003: 19–34).”
- The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy (2012, neutral): “The structure of preferences among principals and agents should determine the nature and extent of multilateralism chosen (Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002).”
- Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European Commissioners and its policy implications (2007, background): “Instead, large parts of the literature portray the Commission as an actor with a pro-integrationist policy agenda in EU politics (Pollack 2003: 78; Hug 2003: 52).”
- A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe (2010, neutral): “In this way the ECJ has become one of the ‘engines of European integration’ (Pollack 2003: ch. 3).”
- Uninvited Europeanization: neofunctionalism and the EU in health policy (2006, background): “focus on the impact of supranational institutions, qualifying it with approaches such as historical institutionalism (Alter 1998), principal–agent analysis (Pollack 2003), and the social study of law (Mattli and Slaughter 1998).”
- Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest (2005, neutral): “2 For fruitful recent applications in comparative politics, see Huber and Shipan (2002), Pollack (1997; 2003), and Thatcher and Stone Sweet, eds.”
- The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post‐Maastricht Era (2015, neutral): “In comitology, for example, participants are formally sent as delegates of national administrations but interaction is mainly deliberative and consensus-seeking (Joerges and Neyer, 1997; Pollack, 2003b; cf. Dehousse et al., 2014).”
- Delegation of powers in the European union: The need for a multi-principals model (2008, background): “…supranational agents may take advantage of their discretionary powers to pursue their own policy preferences and promote integration against the wishes of national governments – an issue which, as is known, occupies a central place in European integration literature (Bauer 2002; Pollack 2003).”