Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European Commissioners and its policy implications

By A. Wonka. 2007

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “…the result of members states’ reluctance to delegate further competences to the Commission (Kelemen 2002: 95) or due to the alleged politicisation of the Commission whereby its ‘trustee’-quality is called into question (Thomson 2008; Wonka 2007) is an interesting one, yet we cannot address it here.”
Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers (2015, unknown): “We expect that there is an underlying solidarity and that the Member States are less likely to oppose proposals from such a Commissioner – not least because they have nominated this person for a seat in the Commission in the first place (Wonka, 2007).”
Tradition and innovation: Europe's accumulated executive order (2008, unknown): “Döring (2007) and Wonka (2007) suggest that the careful selection process at the national level of candidates for a commissioner post results in a close relationship between a commissioner and his or her home government, but they do not present any data substantiating this conclusion.”
Legislative lobbying in context: towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union (2015, unknown): “Moreover, the appointment of the College of Commissioners is increasingly a political process in which party politics plays an important role (Do¨ring 2007; Wonka 2007).”