Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions

By Daron Acemoglu. 2005

313 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d23fd07c3fd97f21375157c8854fa098f0a36aaf

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Rohini Pande
2. Tomasz Mickiewicz
3. Christopher Woodruff
4. Saul Estrin
5. Christopher R. Udry
6. Stefan Voigt
7. V. Rueda
8. Bernd Hayo

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Tomasz Mickiewicz
2. Rohini Pande
3. Saul Estrin
4. Stefan Voigt
5. V. Rueda
6. Bernd Hayo
7. Jens E. Müller
8. L. Blume

Citations in the corpus

• The long Term Effects of the Printing Press in Sub Saharan Africa (2016, background): “Our results complement a growing literature documenting the persistence of development paths in developing countries (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). While this literature mainly compares regions with different institutional ”
• Historical Origins of Schooling: The Role of Democracy and Political Decentralization (2010, unknown): “Finally, I include a 23 A very similar result is found by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) when studying the effect of institutions and income on investment rates.”
• The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size (2004, background): “In a seminal paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [henceforth, AJR] (2001) show that property rights institutions affect GDP per capita in a causal fashion. There is also evidence suggesting specific channels through which institutions affect economic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2003) show a causal”
• The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini (2009, background): “In his review for the Journal of Economic Literature, Daron Acemoglu (2005, 1033) writes: “If the results indeed correspond to the causal effects of the form of government and electoral rules on policies and economic outcomes as PT claim, we have learned more with this book than from the entire comp”
• Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, unknown): “SW (1997b) use an institutional quality index that is related to, but di¤ers from, the rule of law 19See Acemoglu (2005) for a discussion of the use of di¤erent IV-approaches in the institutions and constitutions literature.”
• Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU (2008, unknown): “In a related literature, Acemoglu (2005) outlines the difficulties of dealing with endogeneity issues when assessing the causal effects of institutions/constitutions.”
• Decentralization and Political Institutions (2007, unknown): “"New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions," World Bank Economic Review, 15(1), 165-176.”
• Institutions, Human Capital and Development: Online Appendix (2014, unknown): “Most poor countries have too little taxation and too small a government (e.g., Acemoglu 2005), so meeting with tax authorities might be good, not bad.”
• Institutions and Development:A View from Below (2005, methodology): “Following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) we start with the sample of 64 ex-colonies with settler mortality data.”
• Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, unknown): “Acemoglu (2005) is generally pessimistic about the possibility of identifying causal relationships in comparative political economy and argues that robust noncausal relationships nevertheless are of value to advancement in theoretical analysis and policymaking.”