Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory

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Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings (2010, unknown): “Indeed, estimating a model that includes what we identify as cursed and BRTNI types among others, Dorothea Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) find evidence that more subjects behave in ways similar to BRTNI players than to any other type.”
Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets: An Internet Experiment (2005, background): “Beginning with Lakonishok et al. (1992) researchers were analyzing the tendency of fund managers, security analysts (Welch, 2000), or investment newsletters (Graham, 1999) to herd (for surveys, see e.”
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games (2004, unknown): “In this, we follow recent papers by Holt and Laury (2002) who use a similar approach to calibrate an average hybrid utility function that accounts for decreasing relative risk aversion and Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) who measure depth of reasoning in cascade games.”
Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory (2004, background): “From this distinction it is clear that informational cascades, which are an unobservable phenomenon de…ned with respect to beliefs, is much harder to verify 2 For applications in business strategy, consumer marketing, politics and more, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998).”