Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings

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Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning (2018, unknown): “There is also a considerable literature on the learning implications of various mistakes in interpreting information (see for instance Rabin and Schrag, 1999, Rabin, 2002, Eyster and Rabin, 2010, Madarász, 2009, Rabin and Vayanos, 2010, Benjamin, Rabin and Raymond, 2012).”
Psychology-based Models of Asset Prices and Trading Volume (2018, background): “Summarizing this work, Eyster and Rabin (2010) write: “...it is probably fair to say that the full-rationality model predicts a relatively limited form of herding and does so in a relatively limited set of domains...”
Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies (2015, background): “Social learning can produce herding and inefficient equilibria (Banerjee 1992; Eyster and Rabin 2010).”
Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices (2018, unknown): “Eyster and Rabin (2010) develop the concept of “best response trailing naive inference”: to the extent that agents do infer some private information from earlier actions (or prices), they may neglect how others infer information from actions.”