Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks
By David M. Frankel, Ady Pauzner. 2000
160 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cfa17c3bc10ac69aa898708af97efbb9cc61ae35
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Hyun Song Shin
- Zhiguo He
- Stephen Morris
- Itay Goldstein
- P. Geraats
- George-Marios Angeletos
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Tobias Adrian
Citations in the corpus
- Global Games: Theory and Applications (2003, unknown): “26 See also Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Levin (2000a) for applications following this ap-”
- Dynamic Debt Runs (2010, methodology): “This equilibrium selection insight builds on Frankel and Pauzner (2000), who show that in dynamic coordination games, fundamental shocks can act as a coordination device for agents who choose actions at di¤erent times.”
- Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “The first contribution, which is by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001), uses a friction as in Calvo (1983) to introduce asynchronous choice in a dynamic coordination game and shows that this helps select a unique equilibrium, even when the Calvolike friction is…”
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World (2001, unknown): “It is important to note that, in our model, iterative conditional dominance is not a refinement of Nash equilibrium: every Nash equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game survives the iterative process.(9) When carrying out the iterative procedure, we use a simple method to keep track of the strategies”
- Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (2007, unknown): “A solution to (13) therefore always exists.”
- Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (2003, background): “…of players are unable to adjust their behavior at identical times, they will similarly face non-degenerate beliefs about the population s play, again leading to uniqueness (see, e.g., Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Morris (1995), Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001)).”