Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

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Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games (2007, background): “The convexity and monotonicity conditions in Proposition 4 are clearly satisfied when v(d, x) is multiplicatively separable, v(d, x) = ṽ(d)f(x), f(x) > 0 increasing, ṽ(d) is nondecreasing and convex, and H is convex.(17) In that case, MPS shifts of the degree distribution”
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010, background): “An important challenge to such focal point models comes from the recent literature on “global games” (Carlsson and van Damme 1993; Morris and Shin 1998, 2000, 2003).”
Arms Races and Negotiations (2004, background): “As pointed out by Morris and Shin [23], a unique equilibrium can be the result of either sufficient uncertainty about independent types, or sufficient correlation of types.”
Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure (2011, unknown): “…the slope needs to be greater than 1 for there to be an additional equilibrium in the case of strict concavity, while the case of strict convexity depends on the various values of F(d, 1) across d. 25 Morris and Shin (2003, 2005) consider uncertainty on payoffs rather than on an underlying network.”