Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks

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Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds (2016, unknown): “Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) present an extension of their baseline model, where agents receive noisy signals about the size of attacks during the previous period.”
Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (2008, unknown): “This simply corresponds to the negation of condition (2) for our benchmark model.”
Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change (2013, unknown): “7Other important contributions to the study of endogenous information in coordination games include Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) and Angeletos and Werning (2006). significant unrest and so wants S small even when it survives.8 If θ < S, the regime is overthrown and obtains an outside option…”
Dynamic Debt Runs (2010, background): “Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) develop a dynamic global games model to study the roles played by learning and public information in equilibrium selection and in driving equilibrium dynamics.”