Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists

By S. Huffman. 2009

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ced5852542df6f41bcc008d7a91d1cad6b95705e

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Citations in the corpus

Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Moreover, as predicted by Maug (1998), liquidity encourages activists to acquire additional shares in advance of engaging in activism, contrary to the (unmodeled) arguments of Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) that it encourages cutting and running.”
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “We exclude 13D filings that are filed because the investor is “unwilling to give up the option of affecting the firm” (Clifford (2007)).”
Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “In contrast to Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993), recent papers by Edmans (2008) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2008) suggest that a large shareholder’s option to sell shares and exit the stock serve as a disciplinary mechanism for management.”
A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value (2013, result): “This differs from previous studies that examine the aggregate effect of shareholder governance on firm value (Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012); Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2011); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Comment and Schwert (1995)) as well as studies”
The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes (2011, unknown): “…higher announcement returns than nonconfrontational events do, and activist stakes, which require the filing of a Schedule 13D, generate higher returns than do the revelation of large passive stakes, which can be disclosed with a longer delay on Schedule 13G (see Klein and Zur 2009; Clifford 2008).”
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, unknown): “4 Second, we extend prior work by Clifford (2008), Klein and Zur (2008), Gantchev (2013),”
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (2016, unknown): “…to this earlier work, this paper offers novel evidence that an increased presence of passive investors also affects 7 See, for example, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015; Becht et al., 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2009; Clifford, 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009.”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “In a similar vein, Clifford (2008) finds that, compared with 13G filings, 13D filings by hedge fund activists lead to larger event-study returns and improvements in return on assets, implying an additional return to activism over stock picking (before taking into account the costs of activism).”
Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “Clifford (2008) collects another sample of 1,902 activism cases over the period 1998 to 2005 and focuses on stock price reactions and changes in operating performance.”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, methodology): “Clifford and Lindsey (2011) find that passive governance has a more positive effect on value in companies with high incentives but do not investigate liquidity.”
Investor Activism and Takeovers (2009, background): “Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Wahal (1996), and Gillan and Starks (2000) report that shareholder proposals have historically done little to improve firms’ operations.”
How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation? (2016, background): “The opposite is also plausible since agency problems may lead to under-investment: shareholders may 2 See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Clifford (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), Greenwood and Schor (2009), and Krishnan, Partnoy and Thomas (2015) for U.S. companies; and Becht, Franks, Mayer,…”