Aid Dependence and Governance

By D. Brautigam. 2000

302 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ce59b77fb26828b6c54fe12696e700262530b597

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Citations in the corpus

The institutional economics of foreign aid (2006, unknown): “In this case, each individual donor in effect treats the budget for recurrent expenditures as a common-pool resource (Brautigam 2000), producing a tragedy of commons in which roads are built but not repaired, and schools and clinics are constructed but not staffed.”
On Tax Efforts and Colonial Heritage in Africa (2010, background): “Some suggest that aid is subject to moral hazard, discouraging domestic effort by obviating domestic revenue mobilisation (Brautigam, 2001 ; Ghura, 1998 ; Remmer, 2004 ).”
Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001 (2003, background): “…literature on political and economic reform processes began to argue that it was not feasible to understand processes of reform in Africa without considering the powerful role played by the international donor community (Remmer 1995; Milner 1997; White 1998; Bräutigam 2000; van de Walle 2001).”
Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy (2004, background): “With high levels of aid, recipient governments are accountable primarily to foreign donors rather than to taxpayers: "those with the loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure decisions are international lending agencies" (Brautigam, 1992: 11). High aid levels may also reinforce executive domin”
Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries (2004, background): “discussion, see Brautigam (1999). For a comparison of the potential political conse-”
Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability (2009, unknown): “fungible, external resource: foreign aid ( Brautigam, 2000; Moore, 1998; Therkildsen, 2002).1”
The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid (2010, background): “…the demand for democratic accountability (Knack 2004, Djankov et al. 2008); or aid might increase the power of the president in democracies (Brautigam 2000); or aid might increase political instability by “making control of the government and aid receipts a more valuable prize” (Knack…”
Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, unknown): “Bräutigam (2000) and Azam et al. (1999) attribute part of the success stories of development in Botswana, Korea, and Taiwan to the presence of a single dominant donor offering sufficiently high rewards.”