Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries

By M. Moore. 2004

547 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7685bfe74853fd58dfa8136d5297cced2bd37079

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Sam Jones
2. Richard Snyder
3. J. Acosta
4. E. Dietsche
5. F. Tarp
6. Ravi Bhavnani
7. Jonathan L. Weigel
8. Matt Andrews

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Andrea Gawrich
2. Gurban Alakbarov
3. J. Acosta
4. Richard Snyder
5. E. Dietsche
6. F. Tarp
7. Sam Jones
8. Ravi Bhavnani

Citations in the corpus

• Does foreign aid harm political institutions (2015, background): “First, following the social compact literature (e.g., Moore, 2004), higher quality institutions are often associated with enhanced and/or more cost-efficient domestic revenue collection.”
• The Impact and Effectiveness of Accountability and Transparency Initiatives: The Governance of Natural Resources (2013, background): “Other explanations focused on the negative impact that resource rents had on the workings of political institutions, as they created political incentives for discretionary or non-transparent management of public expenditure to support corrupt and rent-seeking government practices (Mehlum et al., 200”
• Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward (2007, background): “Because natural resource rents allow governments to keep down domestic taxes on other economic activities, they undermine the demand for and the supply of channels for political representation (Moore, 2001, 2004; Ross, 2001).”
• Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double ‘Curse’in Post-Soviet Regimes (2009, background): “The government can then embark on large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation (Moore 2004; Sandbakken 2006; Schmid 1997).”
• Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes (2005, background): “See Schumpeter (1991), Weber (1978), Ardant (1975), Levi (1988), Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1990), and Moore (2004). lootable resources;10 second, the mode of extraction of lootable resources—especially, whether these resources are extracted by hard-to-tax artisans, or alternatively, by large, taxable…”
• The political economy of state-formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic reform, and democratization (2008, background): “These strategic rents form the majority of state revenues in many small states in the Third World ( Moore, 2004 ).”
• Extending the concept of the resource curse: natural resources and public spending on health (2014, background): “Several scholars have posited that the fiscal link between citizens and their government in turn is a strong determinant of government accountability (Bates and Lien, 1985; North and Weingast, 1989, Moore, 2004). Arguably, governments that are able to derive their revenues from natural resources, fa”
• The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them* (2020, background): “Seminal accounts include Schumpeter (1918), Tilly (1985), Bates and Lien (1985), and North and Weingast (1989); more recent theoretical contributions include Moore (2004), Ross (2004), Paler (2013), Martin (2014), and Prichard (2015).”