Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysis
By Fabrizio Gilardi. 2002
528 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cd3c815f69176877d269d6c93a584986e84c0339
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Sociology and Political Science
- Martino Maggetti
- Karoline S. Rogge
- Christel Koop
- Chris Hanretty
- Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
- M. Lodge
- Kristin Reichardt
- David Bach
In Strategy and Management
- Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
- Martino Maggetti
- Christel Koop
- Chris Hanretty
- M. Lodge
- Abraham L. Newman
- David Bach
- Kristin Reichardt
Citations in the corpus
- Policy mixes for sustainability transitions: An extended concept and framework for analysis (2016, background): “We argue that the credibility of the policy mix may play an important role in the achievement of policy objectives and thus in determining the effectiveness of the mix (Gilardi, 2002; Majone, 1997).”
- De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis (2007, methodology): “Gilardi F (2002) Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 9, 873–893. Gilardi F (2005) The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western ”
- The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence (2016, background): “One of the most prevalent theoretical explanations for the rise of regulatory agencies is the need for credible commitment as a tool in policy-making (Gilardi 2002; Majone 1996, 1997, 2002).”
- The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors (2005, background): “…board, relationship with government and parliament, financial and organizational autonomy, and regulatory competencies (see Table 1).6 The index goes from 0 (no independence) to 1 (full independence), and is obtained by taking the average of the five dimensions (for more details, see Gilardi 2002).”
- Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics (2008, background): “…and competition authorities have been able to argue that something along the lines of a ‘regulatory state’ has emerged across European countries, other studies highlighted formal differences in terms of institutional authority, autonomy and responsibilities (see Gilardi 2002; Thatcher 2002, 2005).”
- Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies (2012, methodology): “For example, Gilardi (2002) includes an item about incompatibility between membership of the agency board and other government offices.”
- The European regulatory state and global public policy: micro-institutions, macro-influence (2007, background): “Comprehensive budgetary resources, years of experience, and a high level of professional staffing thus all demonstrate regulatory expertise (Gilardi 2002).”