The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

By Fabrizio Gilardi. 2005

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2fdb5511cbc763796b0768f9c8b8d3a5154978eb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Christel Koop
2. Chris Hanretty
3. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
4. Berthold Rittberger
5. A. Wonka

In Strategy and Management

1. Berthold Rittberger
2. Christel Koop
3. Chris Hanretty
4. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik
5. A. Wonka

Citations in the corpus

• Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “…regulation, the credible commitment problem is supposed to loom particularly large, since a lack of credible commitments on behalf of the legislators is likely to provide a negative signal to potential investors and thus has negative consequences for attracting investment (Gilardi 2005b: 143).”
• The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence (2016, result): “While Hanretty and Koop (2012a) have provided an empirical critique of these data, their improved measure of independence correlates highly with Gilardi’s data (r=0.”
• Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies (2012, background): “These organizations have spread quickly (Gilardi 2005b; Jordana et al. 2009), their independence justified as a solution to politicians’ time-inconsistent preferences (Kydland and Prescott 1977); a way of introducing technocratic Pareto-improving regulation (Majone 1994), or as a way of…”