De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis

By Martino Maggetti. 2007

242 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eae3b57ba66342c1ce26b275ced1fd6c51d3c339

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Christel Koop
2. Chris Hanretty
3. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

In Strategy and Management

1. Christel Koop
2. Chris Hanretty
3. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

Citations in the corpus

• Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies (2012, background): “Maggetti (2007) assesses the degree of independence of 16 West European regulatory agencies, distinguishing between de facto independence from politicians and de facto independence from those who are regulated.”
• The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence (2016, background): “While the theoretical logic behind this argument is obvious, it is less clear that de jure independence also leads to a greater degree of de facto independence (Hanretty and Koop 2012b; Maggetti 2007).”