The Role of Lockups in Initial Public Offerings

By Alon Brav, Paul A. Gompers. 2003

439 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cd34b16d8eb9734b4f46660e2d45ac76bd618ddb

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Citations in the corpus

Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments (2009, background): “…a strong desire for the VC to exit in order to redeploy their assets elsewhere, to distribute assets to the limited partner investors, and to establish an exit track record in order to raise further funds (Gompers 1996; Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Espenlaub et al., 1999; 2001).”
Innovation, Appropriability, And The Underpricing Of Initial Public Offerings (2007, background): “Brav and Gompers (2003) found that VC-backed offerings were more underpriced, and Bradley and Jordan (2002) found no difference in underpricing between IPOs with and without VC backing after controlling for market exchange and underwriter.”
Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup Expiration Selling (2002, positive): “Studies by Field and Hanka (2001), Brav and Gompers (2000), Ofek and Richardson (2000), and Bradley, Jordan, Roten and Yi (2000) show that stock prices for new issues regularly decline at the time of the lockup expiration.”
Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period (2009, background): “Lockups communicate to investors that key employees will remain with the firm for a period of time and signal that insiders are not seeking to cash out in advance of imminent bad news (Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003).”
Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice (2006, positive): “The lockup period to align management with future stockholders ( Brav and Gompers (2003) ) Moderate Support—CFOs view the use of a lockup as an alignment device, but to a lesser degree than the lockup as a signal”
Founders, Private Equity Investors, and Underpricing in Entrepreneurial IPOs (2009, background): “In addition, there is evidence that there are often large amounts of stock released after the IPO as covenants of the lock-up agreement are waived (Brav & Gompers, 2003).”
The Role of Institutional Investors in Initial Public Offerings (2010, positive): “This could be because institutions attempt to avoid the negative returns around the lockup expiration day that has been documented by the existing literature (e.g.,Brav and Gompers 2003).”
Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing (2003, positive): “According to Brav and Gompers (2003), early release is common: 60% of the firms in their sample have insiders sell shares prior to the lock-up expiry.”