Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment

By Georges Dionne, Christian Gouriéroux, C. Vanasse. Journal of Political Economy, 2001

287 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ccdadcf228f7bc874e48c56b5bb62ee9573ffb29

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Amy N. Finkelstein
2. J. Abbring
3. J. Pinquet
4. K. Mcgarry
5. Agapi L. Somwaru
6. S. Makki
7. Pierre-Andre Chiappori
8. Alma Cohen

In General Health Professions

1. Amy N. Finkelstein
2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori

Citations in the corpus

• SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE: Separating Moral Hazard (2013, unknown): “More recently, Cohen (2005) has also found a positive correlation for less experienced policyholders in insurers pools from Israel.2 However, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) found no evidence of asymmetric information among French and Canadian insurers respectively.”
• Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data (2003, background): “Puelz and Snow (1994), Dionne and Vanasse (1992), Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997, 2000), Dionne, Gourie´roux, and Vanasse (1999, 2001), and Richaudeau (1999), to name only a few, analyze car-insurance contracts, whereas Holly, Gardiol, Domenighetti, and Bisig (1998), Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard…”
• EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN CROP INSURANCE MARKETS (2001, background): “However, more recent studies that apply new modeling frameworks have found no evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets (Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 1998; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 2001).”
• Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market. (2006, background): “Several papers, however, find no evidence of a positive correlation in life insurance markets (Cawley and Philipson, 1999; McCarthy and Mitchell, 2003) or in automobile insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Georges Dionne et al., 2001; and Chiappori et al., forthcoming). Table 3 shows the ”
• Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the U.S. Auto Insurance Industry (2014, unknown): “Puelz and Snow (1994) and Dionne et al. (2001) tested for the existence of adverse selection; Cummins and Tennyson (1996), Abbring et al. (2003), and Israel (2007) studied whether evidence for moral hazard in the auto insurance industry can be found.”