The IMF and Economic Development by James Raymond Vreeland

By J. Vreeland. 2003

294 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid (2010, background): “This suggests that the poor record of IMF aid in Africa might be the result of poorly enforced conditionality rather than the use of the wrong policy conditions (Vreeland 2003).”
The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods (2005, background): “…selection models6 have enjoyed a recent burst of popularity in the political science literature (Berinsky 1999; Lemke and Reed 2001; Reed 2000; Timpone 1998; Vreeland 2003), although political methodologists are well aware of the problems with this class of models (Sartori 2003; Signorino 2003).”
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa (2004, background): “In fact, he argues, governments participate in IMF programs in order to shift the distribution of income to benefit owners of capital, regardless of the consequences for national economies (Vreeland 2003).”
Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? (2005, background): “Therefore, if this parameter is significant, selection on unobservable variables does exist (Vreeland, 2003, p. 117).”
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, background): “A more direct test is Smith and Vreeland (2003), evaluating whether participation in IMF programs is rewarded by longer tenure in office despite bad economic conditions.”
The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning? (2007, background): “Vreeland (2003) argues that governments often accept IMF loans because they want conditions imposed on them.”
Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War (2011, background): “There is also a rich vein of literature following the path-breaking work by Putnam (1988) that explores the ways international institutions might indirectly affect the domestic conditions in which leaders operate (Simmons and Martin 1997; Drezner 2003; Vreeland 2003).”
Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa (2007, background): “Including a variable that indicates whether a country is under an IMF agreement in a given year taken from Vreeland (2003) demonstrates that countries under IMF agreements do not impose lower taxes on cash crop farmers, and the coefficient on Contest remains negative and statistically significant…”
“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, background): “The staff are aware that country officials, even those sympathetic to their policy goals, may still have credibility problems because of domestic political constraints (Vreeland 2003).”
The politics of policy diffusion (2019, background): “International organisations like the International Monetary Fund or theWorld Bank shape policy change by setting requirements for aid and loans (Mosley et al. 1995; Vreeland 2003).”
The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “For international monetary and financial institutions see for example (Chwieroth, 2009; Copelovitch, 2010a, 2010b; Dreher et al., 2009; Rickard & Caraway, 2014; Vreeland, 2003).”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “29 E.g., Conway (1994), Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000), Goldstein and Montiel (1986), Khan (1990), Pastor (1987a, 1987b), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Reichmann and Stillson (1978),Vreeland (2003). economic factors do not completely explain compliance.”
The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, methodology): “The content of conditionality in IMF programs is the subject of bargaining between the Fund and the borrower, and this theoretical setting has implications for the appropriate econometric strategy+ Because bargaining involves the strategic use of threats to block agreement, I use data on which count”
The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO (2009, background): “…important and visible role in the formulation of neoliberal prescriptions, to their legitimation, and in their enforcement worldwide.1 1 For more on IMF impact, see Polillo and Guillén 2005; Henisz et al. 2005; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Barro and Lee 2002; Vreeland 2003; Ingram et al. 2005.”
IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014 (2016, background): “It is possible that some governments requested specific policy conditions to overcome domestic opposition to reforms (G€uven 2012; Vreeland 2003), and that some programmes were interrupted or not fully implemented (Arpac, Bird, and Mandilaras 2008).”
THE IMF: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF ITS ROLE AND OPERATIONS (2007, unknown): “…in general, these studies focus on political influences on the supply side, i.e. on the Fund’s response to governments’ applications for assistance, Vreeland (2000, 2003) claims that the existence and number of opposition groups (veto players) affects a government’s willingness to turn to the…”