Rationality in Action

By John R. Searle. 2001

904 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cae8248610d507de70f4f99035fd169437bb0fd2

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice (2013, methodology): “Searle (2001) uses the instrumental rationality of Kohler’s chimp to argue that, under what he calls the Classical Model of rationality, human rationality is just an extension of chimpanzee rationality.”
Reasoning about preferences in argumentation frameworks (2009, background): “As Searle puts it [36], values are often the product of practical reasoning rather than an input to it.”
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights (2015, result): “19 McAdams (2015) argued that legal compliance also results from the expressive power of law to coordinate our behaviour and inform our beliefs. convention, or cost-beneﬁt calculation, in accord with a uni-dimensional calculus of utility or desire (Searle, 2001).”
Mentalizing in Practice (2008, background): “Explicit mentalizing is a substantial domain of our rationality, that is, our capacity to act on the basis of reasons (Scanlon, 1998; Searle, 2001).”
The Psychology of Worldviews (2004, background): “…since Coan’s work, questions regarding agency and will have been debated in psychology from many perspectives (e.g., Bakan, 1996; Howard, 1993, 1994; Rychlak, 1979, 2000, 2003; Searle, 2001; Slife & Fisher, 2000; Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), with no widely accepted resolution in sight.”
Free will in consumer behavior: Self-control, ego depletion, and choice (2008, background): “As Simonson (2005) contended, freedom and conscious will are much more evident in complex decision making that requires cost–benefit analyses and similar reasoning than in the impulsive acts and the spontaneous reactions that are commonly studied and that are indeed readily influenced by nonconsciou”
Including Deontic Reasoning as Fundamental to Theory of Mind (2008, background): “The concepts that we argue are basic to deontic reasoning are the concepts of obligation and permission [for related arguments, see Heider, 1958; Holyoak & Cheng, 1995; Jackendoff, 1999; Searle, 2001; Talmy, 1988].”
Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, neutral): “More precisely, prescriptive norms provide reasons for acting in accordance with those norms (Searle, 2001), with the consequence that normconforming behavior is relatively uninformative about underlying mental states: one need not observe norm-conforming behavior to infer underlying reasons to…”
Argumentation in artificial intelligence (2007, background): “Important too is the notion of direction of fit [171].”