Explaining delusions of control: the comparator model 20 years on.
By ChrisD . Frith. 2012
193 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Mental health, Philosophy
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Andy Clark
- Karl J. Friston
- Micah G. Allen
- S. Wilkinson
- V. Bell
- Rafal Bogacz
- Anil K. Seth
- Jakob Hohwy
In Psychiatry and Mental health
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- Visceral influences on brain and behavior. (2013, unknown): “In a ‘‘comparator model’’ of schizophrenia, it is proposed that disturbances of self (e.g., delusions of control) arise as a consequence of problems in predictive coding, reflecting confusion between evaluation of changes in sensations caused by the self or by external causes (Frith, 2011).”
- From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2016, background): “Thus, although the elegance of comparator models has led to experimental and clinical applications across a variety of cognitive (Frith 2012), social (Kilner et al. 2007; Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013) and affective domains (Seth 2013; Seth et al. 2012), it should be clear that they are…”
- Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. (2013, methodology): “By analogy with comparator models of schizophrenia (Frith 2012; Synofzik et al. 2010), we also suggest that dissociative symptoms, notably depersonalization and derealization arise from imprecise (as opposed to inaccurate) interoceptive prediction error signals.”
- The Representation of Agents in Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (2016, background): “…of delusions of control, theories have focused on problems with the forward prediction of action as a potential explanation (Frith et al. , 2000; Frith, 2012) although, in the vast majority of cases, the symptom does not present solely as an experience of actions without intention and without a…”
- An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2011, unknown): “Models of agency have already been mentioned (see An Interoceptive Predictive-Coding Model of Conscious Presence) and are extensively discussed elsewhere (David et al., 2008; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010; Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010; Frith, 2011; Hauser et al., 2011).”