Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes

By Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini. 2004

450 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Over-optimistic official forecasts and fiscal rules in the eurozone (2013, methodology): “18 The FRSI indices use the random weights method as in Sutherland et al. (2005). 19 Each rule is classified by the government sector that it covers: the central government, regional governments, local governments and social security.”
Fiscal austerity and the trade-off between public investment and social spending (2009, methodology): “The use of a dummy variable is standard in the literature (e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2004)) and the correlation between this dichotomous variable and alternative measures of the proportionality of the electoral system is very high (Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002: 632).”
Extending the concept of the resource curse: natural resources and public spending on health (2014, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2004) confirm that executive accountability influences the composition of government spending for a large sample of democracies. In particular, they conclude that more accountable regimes are associated with more public goods and larger welfare programs. Delavallade (2006) fin”
A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile (2011, background): “…of institutions has been emphasized by Buchanan (1967), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996), Poterba (1997), Poterba and von Hagen (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2004), Wyplosz (2005), Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), and Calderón, Duncan and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010).”
The New Political Economy (2007, background): “It has also been the focus of work in the New Political Economy with important contributions by Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2003, 2004).”
Constitutions and Economic Policy (2004, methodology): “Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) use a data set with 70 democracies in the 1990s, they allow for a separate effect of presidentialism on policy outcomes and take into account the self-selection of countries into different electoral systems.”
VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2007, unknown): “In contrast to Persson and Tabellini (2000), however, they find that under certain assumptions, optimal tax rates are increasing in income for workers up to some income level, ỹ, above which the optimal tax rate is zero (this is because for those with higher income, the implicit rate of return of…”
The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain (2006, background): “accountability. See, for example, Besley and Case (1995) on the effect of term limits of state governors in the US, Persson and Tabellini (1997) on the effect of the separation of powers on political accountability, and Persson and Tabellini (2004) on the effects of different types of political sy”