Constitutions and Economic Policy

By Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini. 2004

321 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5e47ac4b33d759da0015476fa6e2f40867093ab

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Matthaios D. Delis
2. Antonis Adam
3. Pantelis Kammas
4. Robert T. Deacon

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Antonis Adam
2. Pantelis Kammas
3. Robert T. Deacon
4. Matthaios D. Delis

Citations in the corpus

• Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries (2013, background): “Myerson (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004), suggest that as presidential regimes create a direct link between individual performance and re-appointment in office, the elected officials have strong incentives to perform well, which stimulates public sector performance.”
• The Role of the State in Economic Development (2005, unknown): “See in particular Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) , Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003, 2004.)”
• Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform (2005, unknown): “We also tested several political economy variables from Beck et al. (2000), following work by Myerson (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2004, 2002) showing that electoral rules and other political institutions can affect government spending and corruption levels.”
• Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy (2009, background): “For empirical evidence on links between public good spending and variations in democratic institutions, see Lott and Kenny (1999), Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2004), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) and Baqir (2002).”
• The interaction of entrepreneurship and institutions (2010, unknown): “A constitution is a prime example of an economically significant political institution because of its implications for voting systems, for example, and directives controlling a country’s degree of centralization and federalism (Persson and Tabellini, 2004, 2006).”