Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: an MPEC approach

By Benjamin F. Hobbs, Carolyn B. Metzler, Jong-Shi Pang. 2000

888 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c6893b0dcf80d9bb86b6fe0106120fa435e6ce6d

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Citations in the corpus

A Large-Scale Spatial Optimization Model of the European Electricity Market (2012, background): “A third type of models can be found in the multistage equilibrium models being the most complicated and less developed ones (for example Hobbs et al. 2000 ).”
Pool Strategy of a Producer With Endogenous Formation of Locational Marginal Prices (2009, background): “Reference [10] presents a strategic gaming model where the single-firm problem is formulated as an MPEC.”
Congestion-driven transmission expansion in competitive power markets (2004, background): “Minimization of total social cost (total apparent production cost minus total apparent consumer benefit) is set as the objective [2], [3], [5].”
Evaluation of peer-to-peer energy sharing mechanisms based on a multiagent simulation framework (2018, background): “the assumption a prosumer makes about its rivals’ response to its actions) can be adopted [49], besides the one used in this paper, which assumes that rival prosumers make their decisions assuming that other prosumers will not change theirs.”
Strategic bidding under uncertainty: a binary expansion approach (2005, methodology): “This approach forms the basic framework for the well-known Bertrand and Cournot models [7], widely used in game-theoretical equilibrium models (see [10], [11], and [19]).”
Oligopolistic equilibrium analysis for electricity markets: a nonlinear complementarity approach (2004, methodology): “The IEEE 30-bus test system, which has been studied in [ 8 ], is considered in the third example.”
Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices (2007, background): “…area of noncooperative games that model electricity markets over a network of generators and consumers in the style of Berry et al. (1999), see also Backerman et al. (2000), Cardell et al. (1997), Hobbs et al. (2000); and also Hu et al. (2004) for a brief review of these and related market models.”
Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets (2016, background): “The market power of strategic electricity producers (SEPs) has been well explored in existing studies since the pioneer work [9].”
Optimal Bidding Strategies for Hydro-Electric Producers: A Literature Survey (2014, neutral): “problem [20], [21], [22].”
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Energy Trading in the Smart Grid (2013, methodology): “A strategic g ame model was developed in [22] to analyze an oligopoly within an energy market with various grid-level constraints.”
Electricity Producer Offering Strategies in Day-Ahead Energy Market With Step-Wise Offers (2007, background): “In order to compute the corresponding supply function equilibrium, an iterative (diagonalization) model in which every producer in sequence solves his own MPEC until convergence would be required [14].”
Two-stage stochastic bilevel programming over a transportation network (2013, methodology): “Always in the realm of energy modeling, a bilevel multi-stage stochastic programming model has been presented by Kalashnikov et al. (2010) to formulate the natural gas cash-out problem.”
Coupon-Based Demand Response Considering Wind Power Uncertainty: A Strategic Bidding Model for Load Serving Entities (2016, methodology): “Consequently, the bi-level optimization problem is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) by integrating the lower level problem into the upper level problem using its KKT conditions as the extra complimentary constraints [22], [34], [35].”