Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices

By Xinmin Hu, D. Ralph. Operational Research, 2007

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Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (2007, neutral): “These problems naturally arise when considering multi-leaderfollower games used in modeling complex competition situations, see, e.g., (Ehrenmann 2004; Fukushima and Pang 2005; Hu and Ralph 2006; Leyffer and Munson 2005; Zhou et al. 2005).”
MULTI-LEADER-FOLLOWER GAMES: MODELS, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (2015, background): “Several researchers have studied this kind of problems by means of the multi-leader-follower game and the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; see [37, 42], Here, based on the model in [60], we introduce an approach to dealing with the electricity power market as the multi-leader-follow”
Equilibria in an Oligopolistic Electricity Pool With Stepwise Offer Curves (2012, methodology): “The most extended methods to solve EPECs are based on diagonalization algorithms [11]–[13], [19].”
On M-stationary points for a stochastic equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints in electricity spot market modeling (2007, neutral): “A stochastic EPEC (SEPEC) modeling an electricity market under demand uncertainty is studied in [4].”
Pool Strategy of a Producer With Endogenous Formation of Locational Marginal Prices (2009, background): “Particularly, [13] presents a mixed-integer linear programing solution approach for the EPEC of finding Nash equilibrium in short-term electricity markets and [14] studies a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model with LMPs.”