Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

By Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler. 2009

346 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Development, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c56056708a3f34d607e2ff7216e557bf50b5029e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Building and Construction

1. S. Lin
2. Donghyeon Kim
3. S. Bhattacharyya
4. Eoin F. McGuirk
5. F. van der ploeg
6. Anthony J. Venables
7. R. Hodler
8. Paul Collier

In Development

1. Eoin F. McGuirk
2. F. van der ploeg
3. S. Lin
4. Donghyeon Kim
5. S. Bhattacharyya
6. Paul Collier
7. G. d’Agostino
8. E. Dietsche

In Economics and Econometrics

1. F. van der ploeg
2. S. Bhattacharyya
3. Donghyeon Kim
4. S. Lin
5. Paul Collier
6. Eoin F. McGuirk
7. Anthony J. Venables
8. R. Hodler

Citations in the corpus

• Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption (2010, background): “assume that politicians get zero utility when not in office.(13) A key feature of the model is the democratic institutions.”
• The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability (2013, background): “It was initially developed by Collier and Hoe-er (2009), who de…ne rents as the di¤erence between the resource price and the extraction costs.”
• Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability (2016, neutral): “…autocratic institutions using predominantly comparative case studies or cross-country variation (Ross, 2001a, 2001b, 2009; Ulfelder, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2009; Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Tsui, 2011).3 While there is some heterogeneity in the conclusions this literature tends to reach, the…”
• Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward (2007, background): “Collier and Hoeffler (2006) have tested the neoconservative agenda that democracy is the solution to making better use of the economic opportunities of natural resourcerich countries.”
• Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “Another study suggests that the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems retards growth, unless there are sufficient checks and balances which is not the case in many new resource rich democracies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009).”
• Public capital in resource rich economies: is there a curse? (2014, methodology): “Others have argued whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a,b).”
• Managing Resource Revenues in Developing Economies (2010, background): “Democracy and resource rents also appear to interact badly (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009).”
• Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, methodology): “Collier and Hoeffler (2009) investigate whether the effect of democracy on growth is distinctive in resource-rich societies.”