Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance

By Renée B. Adams, Heitor Almeida, Daniel Ferreira. 2005

144 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c46ba8491fa2d293c1f578caa299046ac5b0717c

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Risk Taking and Ownership Structure (2010, unknown): “Adams et al. (2005) posit that firms with powerful CEOs will have less extreme performance because they have to compromise with other executives when they disagree, thus achieving a diversification of opinions effect.”
• Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area (2011, unknown): “, Yermack, 1996; Faleye, 2007), CEO ownership and power (e.g. Habib and Ljungqvist, 2005; Adams et al., 2005) and other aspects of corporate governance are neglected.”
• Implications of Power: When the CEO Can Pressure the CFO to Bias Reports (2014, unknown): “2 1The CEO’s power over the CFO can arise, for example, from the …rm’s hierarchical structure, the CEO being a blockholder, other employees’loyalty to the CEO, the CEO’s personality, and the CEO’s prestige (Adams et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2011; Finkelstein, 1992; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; La”
• CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, unknown): “and Adams, Almeida and Ferreria [2005] identify characteristics of top executives related to firm”
• Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2017, unknown): “For example, more powerful CEOs may be able to have more influence on the firm and help the firm succeed (e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005, 2009; Anderson and Reeb, 20 03; Fahlenbrach, 20 09 ) but are also more entrenched and may be able to carry out actions that are to their personal…”
• Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation (2013, unknown): “…evidence of manager-level style effects in leverage choices (Frank and Goyal (2007)), compensation levels (Graham, Li, and Qiu (2009)), accounting/tax choices (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010)), and performance variability (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005)).”
• Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2017, unknown): “Our conjecture that diversity fosters moderation in board decisions is similar to the intuition of Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), who show that firm risk increases with CEO’s power.”
• Corporate Boards and the Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices (2007, unknown): “Adams et al. (2005) show that firms with powerful CEOs experience more variability in performance.”
• Why do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations (2011, unknown): “Existing literature suggests that CEOs are more powerful when they hold the position of Chairman of the Board, and CEO power is positively associated with status as a company founder (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Adams et al., 2005).”