Competing Payment Schemes

By Graeme Guthrie, Julian Wright. 2007

183 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c419d7dc3e7c7efc5ef376ad4778b362f5438918

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Citations in the corpus

One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets (2004, unknown): “Guthrie and Wright (2003) demonstrate this result formally in a model with perfect competition between card schemes.”
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks (2006, background): “The perceived price elasticity of a competitive network will always be larger than that of a monopolistic cartel, and competition unambiguously reduces both merchant and consumer fees.”
MUST-TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS (2011, background): “Guthrie and Wright (2007) analyze a more general model of platform competition, where cardholders’ multi-homing decision is endogenized.”
Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003, unknown): “Guthrie and Wright (2003) model competition between two identical payment networks under the assumption of one-price policies.”
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, background): “Armstrong, M. (2004) “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” mimeo, University College, London.”
Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “Articles in the payment literature that share these features include Rochet 5 and Tirole (2002, 2011), Wright (2004, 2012), Farrell (2006), and Guthrie and Wright (2007).”
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms (2010, methodology): “Thus the RT2006 model takes a “macro” approach, in the terminology of Nicholas Economides (1996).”
Consumer payment choice: Merchant card acceptance versus pricing incentives (2015, background): “Guthrie and Wright (2007) demonstrate that platform competitionwill tend todrive interchange feeshigher in order to provide consumers strong incentives (rewards) to use one card exclusively, commonly referred to as single-homing.”