Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis

By J. Prinz. 2004

695 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c3ec7f0285e40e7727e89b64e88e5e390fa32ac6

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

Citations in the corpus

Doing without Concepts (2009, methodology): “To spell out these two central theses, I rely mostly on Barsalou’s sophisticated theory of concepts, “the perceptual symbol hypothesis,” developed in his 1999 target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, and on Prinz’s proxytype theory (2002).(54) These theses are the following:”
A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science (2012, background): “He gives considerable attention, for example, to the conceptual metaphor approach originating with Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and to the concept empiricist approach of Barsalou (1999, 2008; Barsalou et al. 2003) and Prinz (2002).”
The Centrality of Language in Human Cognition (2016, background): “…exemplars into a common category, we can learn what the most diagnostic dimensions of that category are (for discussion, see Margolis & Laurence, 1999; Murphy, 2002; Prinz, 2004), inferring those properties in instances when they are not directly observed—a key way in which we create new knowledge.”
Is the mind really modular (2005, background): “I don't find these conjectures plausible (see Prinz, 2002).”
Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception (2018, background): “The idea that concepts must be repeatable is a theme running through theorists as different as Evans (1982), Prinz (2002), Fodor (1998), and every cognitive psychologist I can think of.”
Grounded Cognition: Past, Present, and Future (2010, background): “In turn, internal representations have a situated character, implemented via simulations in the brain's modal systems, making them well suited for interfacing with external structures.”
Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts (2007, background): “This multiple-level view of concepts is an essential feature of our view that is radically different from the theory of concepts proposed by Jesse Prinz (2002).”
The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience (2010, background): “Fodor 1975, 1998, Jackendoff 1987, Lawrence and Margolis 1999, Carruthers 2000, Prinz 2002 ), or prototypes (e.g.”
Perceptual Learning, Cognition, and Expertise (2013, background): “Some have asserted that in general, abstract concepts have crucial perceptual foundations (Barsalou, 1999; Goldstone, Landy, & Son, 2008; Prinz, 2004).”
Embodiment in Attitudes, Social Perception, and Emotion (2005, background): “For examples of these theoretical accounts, see Barsalou (1999, 2003a), Churchland et al. (1994), Clark (1997), Glenberg (1997), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Prinz (2002), and Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991).”
Varieties of abstract concepts and their multiple dimensions (2019, background): “…fully confirms the predictions of the WAT view (Borghi et al., 2018a), and testifies that at the increase of the abstractness level we rely more on the competence of others (see also Prinz, 2004, 2014; Shea, 2018), and that social and linguistic experience is crucial for the representation of ACs.”