EARNINGS QUALITY IN UK PRIVATE FIRMS: COMPARATIVE LOSS RECOGNITION TIMELINESS

By Ray Ball, L. Shivakumar. 2005

2,344 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c11c9bd0b5cf5ebe089ac940279fe8e8748fae5a

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Citations in the corpus

Earnings quality: Evidence from the field (2013, background): “4%), consistent with findings that private firms manage earnings more (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).”
Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation (2009, positive): “Ball and Shivakumar (2004) report that the 1981 Companies Act in the UK allowed less rigorous reporting standards for small and medium-size firms (versus large firms) as a way of protecting these firms’ financial affairs from public scrutiny.”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “In particular, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that timely loss recognition provides a signal that the market, the board, and other stakeholders can - 54 ‐ use to learn about the profitability of an investment.”
Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements (2009, neutral): “, Ball and Shivakumar [2005]).”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, neutral): “…dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty. adverse economic conditions limits a firm’s propensity to engage in income-increasing practices, and thus their ability to hoard bad news [Jenkins et al. (2009); Ball and Shivakumar (2005)] a necessary condition for the occurrence of crashes.”
Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence (2007, positive): “We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms in place (stronger boards) will present more conditionally conservative accounting numbers, as defined by Basu (1997) and by Ball and Shivakumar (2005).”
Optimal Impairment Rules (2009, positive): “Similarly, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) stress the governance role of conservatism to increase management incentives in order to limit economic losses.”
Earnings quality research: Advances, challenges and future research (2010, background): “…While BLOCKIN BLOCKIN there BLOCKIN BLOCKIN are BLOCKIN BLOCKIN now multiple proxies designed to empirically measure conservatism (e.g., Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Khan and Watts, 2009), general acceptance of a given proxy or subset of proxies is still evolving.”
Business groups in developing capital markets: Towards a complementarity perspective (2015, background): “Third, capital market participation and the resultant checks may restrict the involvement of a firm in any BG-level synergy programs, unless they directly benefit the focal firm (see, for example, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, on the earnings quality improvements in public firms).”
Global Accounting Convergence and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the U.S. (Part I): Conceptual Underpinnings and Economic Analysis (2010, background): “…highlights he importance of firms’ reporting incentives as a key driver of observed reporting quality e.g., all et al. 2000, 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006 . hese studies recognize that accounting standards give firms substantial reporting discretion…”
Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2010, positive): “Although none of our results are substantially changed after controlling for size, which, among other things, is a control for the taxation demand for accounting conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Khan and Watts [2009]), we perform a formal test using two direct measures of tax aggressiveness”