Autopoiesis and Cognition

By Paul Bourgine, John Stewart. Artificial Life, 2004

591 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Biomedical Engineering, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Molecular Biology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c07ab049d23ff6643acbdc7597bffeb243af15c7

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Citations in the corpus

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories (2009, background): “But their sense-making cannot be derived simply from their being autopoietic, for mere autopoiesis is not sufficient for sensemaking (Bitbol and Luisi 2005; Bourgine and Stewart 2004; Di Paolo 2005, this issue; Thompson 2007, pp. 122–127, 147–148).”
Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, methodology): “Cognition, in the present perspective, amounts to the emergent characteristics of this dynamical system” (Bourgine & Stewart 2004).”
Moving innovation systems research to the next level: towards an integrative agenda (2017, unknown): “Overall, however, it is fair to say that the IS approach did not draw extensively on any of the elaborated systems theories—for example, synergetics (Haken, 1983; Weidlich, 1991), theory of social systems (Luhmann, 1988), and autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980).”
Cognitive Perspectives in Psychology (2013, background): “…, which we will examine in more detail later, shows that the central nervous system is informationally closed, and that cognitive activity is prompted by perturbations in the environment that are not represented in any analogous way in the mind (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987; Bickhard, 2000).”
A systemic and cognitive view on collaborative knowledge building with wikis (2008, background): “They produce their own elements (for a detailed elaboration on the phenomenon of autopoiesis cf. Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 1974; or Luhmann 1986, 1990).”
Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela (2004, unknown): “See Chalmers (1996, 1997) and Kim (1998).”
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience (2005, background): “…as a selfproducing and self-maintaining network that constructs its own membrane boundary and actively regulates its background or boundary conditions so as to remain viable in its environment (Maturana and Varela 1980; Bitbol and Luisi 2004; Bourgine and Stewart 2004; Di Paolo, this volume).”
The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective (2016, background): “…to an analysis of the factors involved, it is quite necessary to start from the unity of function and see that the distinction of organism and environment arises because of adaptation in that process, not vice versa (Dewey 1976, p. 275, as quoted by Costall 2004, see also Maturana and Varela 1980).”
Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency (2017, background): “This conception of cognition reached The Embodied Mind and it has since permeated what Hutto and Myin label as ‘‘autopoietic enactivism’’ (Hutto and Myin 2012) that has many contemporary variations (Bourgine and Stewart 2004; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; Froese and Di Paolo 2011; Thompson 2007).”
Learning to make sense: what works in entrepreneurial education? (2011, background): “What this suggests is that the role human agency plays in the knowledge performance of the firm’s agent, a view further supported by Maturana and Varela (1998) where knowing is defined as effective action in which knowing is implied in application or action.”