The price of anarchy of finite congestion games

By George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias. Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2005

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Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism Design (2015, methodology): “Finally, as an intermediate step in our formalization, we provide the first formal verification of incentive compatibility for the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.”
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow (2005, result): “The degradation of network performance caused by the lack of a centralized authority can be measured using the worst-case coordination ratio (price of anarchy) suggested by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14, 19] which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash Equilibrium and the social optimum”
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation (2004, unknown): “Subsequent to our work, further results on the price of anarchy and stability in atomic games with delays were obtained in [4, 7, 11, 10, 40].”
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy (2005, background): “The price of anarchy of selfish routing has also been studied with objective functions other than (3) [21, 46, 64, 68, 86]; with edge capacities and other types of “side constraints” [22, 34, 39]; when the traffic rates can vary with the network congestion [14, 19]; when network users can have nonne”