Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence

By Timothy J. Besley, Stephen Coate. 2003

449 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Pharmacology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be676e4270a524c25c26aa951fe4bfd126a4dbf2

Citations in the corpus

• Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments (2007, unknown): “As stressed by Besley and Coate (2003) in the context of electricity regulators, if the regulatory dimension is not the salient one in a gubernatorial election, incumbent politicians are effectively given free rein in appointing their favourite regulator, and are possibly influenced by interest…”
• Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from Public Governance? (2006, unknown): “The current pay-for-performance systems arguably give CEOs incentives to act in an even more short-sighted way, as the recent corporate scandals have made clear.”
• Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India (2008, unknown): “…civil services (SCS promotees), the latter category being restricted to not more than one-third of officers in a state.8 6 On comparing decisions of appointed versus elected officials, see Besley and Coate (2003), Besley and Payne (2003), Khemani (2003), Lim (2008), and Weingast and Moran (1983).”
• Women in politics: evidence from the Indian states (2011, unknown): “[9] Besley,T.”
• Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks (2008, unknown): “Besley and Coate (2003) find evidence that, in US states, elected regulators tend to keep lower electricity prices compared to appointed regulators.”
• Regulatory Capture: A Review (2006, unknown): “ Besley and Coate (2003) attack the question of whether selection methods matter using a panel of pass-through decisions regarding fossil-fuel costs.”
• Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation (2007, unknown): “This assumption is introduced for example by Besley and Coate (2003) in the context of US data.”
• Bank Risk Taking and Liquidity Creation Following Regulatory Interventions and Capital Support (2011, unknown): “First, the economics literature on appointed regulators argues that politicians adopt policies in line with the interests of stakeholders because doing so increases their chances of re-election (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Besley and Coate, 2003; Botero et al., 2004).”
• Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India (2003, unknown): “Thanks also to Abhijit Banerjee, Robin Burgess, Steve Coate, Lena Edlund, Maitreesh Ghatak, Torsten Persson, Ken Shepsle and numerous seminar participants for comments.”
• Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy (2017, unknown): “As it is well known in the literature, decisions of politicians with electoral incentives are different from decisions of bureaucrats (Besley and Coate, 2003; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007).”