Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

By Lakshmi Iyer, A. Mani. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008

271 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d1f3a5f843782c14016f2c72d319ea9d56f8da30

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Citations in the corpus

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature† (2016, background): “25 For evidence on manipulative transfers of Indian administrative officers, see Iyer and Mani (2012). A randomized experimental study in the police department in Rajasthan, India by Banerjee et al (2012) showed that a freeze on transfer of police staff increased police effectiveness.”
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (2020, background): “…2017; Weaver, 2017; Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017; Bertrand et al., 2018; Khan et al., 2018), the impact of political oversight over the bureaucracy (Iyer and Mani, 2011; Rogger, 2014; Gulzar and Pasquale, 2016; Ornaghi (2016)), and bureaucrats’ management practices and effectiveness (Best et al.,…”
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India (2016, background): “Of relevance for this study, Iyer and Mani (2012) do not find robust evidence that politically induced transfers have negative impacts on development at the district level.”
Cultural proximity and loan outcomes (2017, unknown): “[39] Iyer, Lakshmi and Anandi Mani, 2011, “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India,” Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.”
Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings (2019, unknown): “Yet despite the potential for postings to be used as an incentive device, in practice, in most bureaucracies, many other factors other than performance – such as personal or political connections, or idiosyncratic preferences of managers, or simply bureaucratic arbitrariness – are used to assign pos”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, background): “Iyer and Mani (2012) examined a comprehensive data set that tracks the careers of elite Indian Administrative Service personnel.”